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AARTICLESBlack Lives Matter and the Call for Death
Penalty Abolition*
Michael Cholbi and Alex Madva
The Black Lives Matter movement has called for the abolition of capital punish-
ment in response to what it calls “the war against Black people” and “Black com-
munities.”This article defends the two central contentions in themovement’s ab-
olitionist stance: first, that US capital punishment practices represent a wrong to
black communities rather than simply a wrong to particular black capital defen-
dants or particular black victims of murder, and second, that the most defensible
remedy for this wrong is the abolition of the death penalty.The Black Lives Matter movement has called for a number of social, polit-
ical, and legal reforms in response to what it calls “the war against Black
people” and “Black communities” in the United States. Among these is
the abolition of capital punishment on the grounds that the death penalty
in the United States is a “racist practice” that “devalues Black lives.”1
The movement’s abolitionist stance invites at least two crucial phil-
osophical questions. As the movement’s platform notes (and as we docu-
ment later in Sec. I), a wide body of studies indicate that (a) black capital
defendants are more likely to be subject to execution than defendants of
other races and (b) those whomurder blacks are less likely to be subject to
execution than are those whomurder members of other races. But those
philosophers and jurists who, unlike the movement, do not find capital* We gratefully acknowledge the comments and feedback on earlier drafts provided by
David Adams, Cory Aragon, Carl Cranor, Katie Gasdaglis, Stephen Munzer, Peter Ross, the
editors and anonymous reviewers at Ethics, and Cal Poly Pomona students present at a de-
partmental “brown bag” presentation in February 2017.
1. Movement for Black Lives Platform, “End the War on Black People,” https://policy
.m4bl.org/end-war-on-black-people/.
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Apunishment “morally repugnant” are likely to doubt that such statistical
findings indicate that capital punishment is a racist practice that wrongs
black communities, even when viewed in the historical context of trou-
bling “policing” practices that devalue black lives (e.g., lynchings).2 Some
death penalty retentionistsmay concede that this statistical evidence shows
that American capital punishment has mistreated particular black capital
defendants or murder victims unjustly and may therefore welcome re-
forms aimed at reducing the likelihood of such mistreatment. But they
may well be unmoved (as US courts largely have been) by the claim that
capital punishment has been a front in a war against black people in gen-
eral. Answering these defenders thus seems to necessitate an argument
that fleshes out more explicitly the movement’s claims that these capital
punishment practices are a wrong to black communities, an argument in-
voking an ethical idiom that defenders of capital punishment cannot so
readily dismiss.
Supposing, however, that such an argument can be provided, a sec-
ondquestion arises: if US capital punishment practices represent an injus-
tice to black communities, why is abolition the most defensible response
to this injustice? There are, after all, other possible remedies short of out-
right abolition.
Here we defend themovement’s call for abolition by engaging these
two questions. With respect to the first, we draw on arguments previously
developed by one of us (Cholbi).3 Cholbi’s arguments are distinctive within
the debate on race and capital punishment in the United States. While
they do not deny that black Americans suffer retributive injustices in the
US capital punishment regime (i.e., particular black defendants andmur-
der victims are treated in comparatively unjust ways by that regime), they
further propose that black Americans as a class suffer a kind of distributive
injustice under that regime. More specifically, black Americans do not re-
ceive either the equal protection of or equal status under the law.
We then propose (in Sec. II) that the discriminatory patterns in cap-
ital punishment that generate this injustice are explained, in part, by im-
plicit racial biases. The biases in question are both general, relating to per-
ceptions of black criminality, and specific, likely to be triggered in contexts
where prosecutors, judges, and jurors make “life or death” choices about
capital charges, convictions, and sentences. The effect of such biases is to
makemurder (at least in the United States) a racially coded act, such that
its moral gravity is calibrated in part based on the race of those who com-
mit it or those who are its victims. That is, notwithstanding the obvious
wrongness and illegality of sentencing on the basis of a victim’s or defen-
dant’s race, our criminal justice institutions systematically treat certain2. Ibid.
3. Michael Cholbi, “Race, Capital Punishment, and the Cost of Murder,” Philosophical
Studies 127 (2006): 255–82.
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Amurders as more brutal andmorally heinous partly because they are com-
mitted by blacks or against whites. Situations involving judgments about
capital punishment, we suggest, tend to activate and amplify racial bias in
distinctive ways. Preexisting biases regarding blacks’ proclivity toward and
insusceptibility to violence that may otherwise remain dormant are galva-
nized when individuals are afforded the opportunity to render judgments
regarding who ought to be executed for their crimes. In other words, the
possibility of the death penalty (as opposed to life imprisonment serving
as the maximum possible penalty) arouses race-based biases that distort
judgments regarding the justifiability of imposing death as a punishment.
These biases impact not only capital sentences as such but also intuitive
judgments of guilt, appraisals of incriminating evidence, charging deci-
sions, assessments of the severity of pain and suffering, and generalmoral
intuitions related to punitiveness and desert. In sum, the capital punish-
ment regime elicits biases that in turn generate race-based injustice. The
social meaning of murder thus comes to vary systematically with the races
of those involved.4
In Section III, we propose that in light of the role implicit biases play
in capital sentencing in theUnited States, not to address this discrimination
amounts to a form of societal or institutional recklessness. The continu-
ation of the American capital punishment regime means that American
society and its judicial and policing bodies engage in unjustified risk-
taking with respect to the legal status of black lives, risk-taking of which
they are knowingly aware and so culpable.5 In our estimation, although
the abolition of the death penalty does little to address past injustice of
this kind, it nevertheless would be the most justifiable remedy for this
recklessness going forward. We show in Sections IV and V that abolition
is unique among plausible remedies both in eliminating the discrimina-
tory effects of this bias-based recklessness and in not being itself unjust.6
Thus, while imperfect, the abolition of the death penalty is the least mor-
ally perilous response consistent with the aim of eliminating this unjust
recklessness that places the lives of black Americans at risk. Section VI ad-
dresses two objections to our proposal for abolition, while Section VII
places our argument in the context of recent theoretical accounts of ra-
cial injustice.4. For more on social meaning, see, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, “The Regulation of Social
Meaning,” University of Chicago Law Review 62 (1995): 943–1045.
5. Findlay Stark, Culpable Carelessness: Recklessness and Negligence in the Criminal Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
6. This paper is an exercise in nonideal reflection, in two senses: first, our aim here is
not to offer a comprehensive or partial characterization of an ideally just criminal system,
but to consider concrete remedies for a pressing social ill, and to focus on remedies that
are feasible in the near term, given the current state of US politics; second, we intend for
our analysis of the relevant injustice, as well as our corrective prescription, to be grounded
in social scientific research.
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In its 1972 Furman decision, the US Supreme Court vacated the death
sentences of three black defendants on the grounds that the state statutes
under which they were sentenced gave judges and juries insufficient
guidance regarding when defendants should be sentenced to death.7 Al-
though the defendants’ legal counsel presented evidence indicating that
racial bias influenced capital sentencing, the Court’s reasoning was not
primarily grounded in concerns about racial bias. Rather, the Court held
that the state’s capital punishment regime violated the Eighth Amend-
ment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishment” because, thanks to a lack
of clear sentencing guidelines, “there is no meaningful basis for distin-
guishing the few cases in which it [death] is imposed from themany cases
in which it is not.” The imposition of the death penalty, it concluded, was
“wanton,” “freakish,” and “arbitrary.” In response to Furman, states intro-
duced a number of reforms tomore explicitly regulate capital sentencing,
measures which (courts subsequently ruled) rendered state capital pun-
ishment statutes constitutionally sound.8 These reforms included the es-
tablishment of more precise sentencing guidelines, requiring that both
aggravating and mitigating factors be taken into account; the bifurcation
of capital trials into guilt andpenalty phases; automatic appellate reviewof
capital cases; and proportionality review, in which a state appellate court
can consider whether a given capital sentence aligns with, or is instead dis-
proportionate to, other sentences issued in the state’s capital cases.
Given that the Furman ruling de-emphasized the role of racial bias in
capital sentencing, it is unclear whether the Court expected (or hoped)
that the sentencing reforms implemented thereafter would mitigate the
effects of racial bias.9 What is clear, however, is that seemingly discrimina-
tory racial patterns in capital sentencing have not abated despite these re-7. Furman vs. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
8. Most centrally in Gregg vs. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), but see also Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Zant v. Ste-
phens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987); Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U.S. 356 (1988); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.
764, 774 (1990); Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40 (1992).
9. That the Court later ruled (in McCleskey vs. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 [1987]) that evi-
dence concerning patterns of racial discrimination is irrelevant to the legitimacy of any par-
ticular death sentence—that defendants can only advance a valid claim of racial discrimina-
tion by citing evidence of discrimination in their own case—indicates that the Court came to
be more skeptical of the racial bias critique than it had indicated in Furman. Indeed, the ev-
idence for racial bias was, by the time of theMcCleskey ruling, arguablymore compelling than
it had been when Furman was rendered. See esp. David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and
George Woodworth, “Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the
Georgia Experience,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 74 (1983): 661–753.
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Aforms. Empirical studies conducted since 2000 indicate that, with respect
to racial discrimination, the post-Furman reforms have had modest suc-
cess at best. Indeed, they suggest that thehistorical patterns inwhichblack
defendants have been statistically more likely to be sentenced to death
than defendants of other races or ethnicities and in which nonwhite de-
fendants are statistically more likely to be sentenced to die for killing
whites than for killing individuals of other races or ethnicities continue
to the present day. Studies conducted since 2000 in Arizona, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas, and Wash-
ington have concluded that black defendants are more likely to face a
death penalty prosecution or to be sentenced to death than defendants
of other races.10 Studies conducted since 2000 in Alabama, Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, New
Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
the armed forces have shown an even stronger effect on capital sentencing
based on victims’ race, concluding that those who kill whites aremore likely
to be sentenced to die than those who kill members of other racial and eth-
nic groups.11 These two effects also appear to interact, so that “cases involv-10. For Arizona, see American Bar Association Death Penalty Due Process Review Proj-
ect, “Arizona Death Penalty Assessment Report” (2006). For Colorado, see Meg Beardsley
et al., “Disquieting Discretion: Race, Geography and the Colorado Death Penalty in the
First Decade of the Twenty-first Century,” Denver University Law Review 92 (2015): 431–52.
For Connecticut, see John J. Donohue, “An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death
Penalty System since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Dispari-
ties?,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 11 (2014): 637–96. For Delaware, see Sheri Johnson
et al., “The Delaware Death Penalty: An Empirical Study,” Iowa Law Review 97 (2012): 1925–
64. For Maryland, see Raymond Paternoster et al., “Justice by Geography and Race: The
Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978–1999,” University of Maryland
Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class 4 (2004): 1–97. For New Mexico, see M. Wil-
son, “The Application of the Death Penalty in New Mexico, July 1979 through December
2007: An Empirical Analysis,” New Mexico Law Review 38 (2008): 255–301. For Ohio, see
American Bar Association Death Penalty Due Process Review Project, “Ohio Death Penalty
Assessment Report” (2007). For Texas, see Scott Phillips, “Racial Disparities in the Capital
of Capital Punishment,” Houston Law Review 45 (2008): 807–40. For Washington, see Kath-
erine Beckett and Heather Evans, “The Role of Race in Washington State Capital Sentenc-
ing,1981–2012,”commissionedreport(Law,SocietiesandJusticeProgramandDepartmentof
Sociology, University of Washington; 2014), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents
/WashRaceStudy2014.pdf.
11. For Alabama, see American Bar Association Death Penalty Due Process Review
Project, “Alabama Death Penalty Assessment Report” (2006). For Arkansas, see David C.
Baldus, Julie Brain, Neil A. Weiner, and George Woodworth, “Evidence of Racial Discrimi-
nation in theUse of theDeath Penalty: A Story from Southwest Arkansas (1990–2005),”Ten-
nessee Law Review 76 (2009): 555–613. For California, see Glenn L. Pierce and Michael L.
Radelet, “Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for California
Homicides, 1990–1999,” Santa Clara Law Review 46 (2005): 1–47. For Connecticut, see
Donohue, “Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System.” For Delaware,
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Aing black defendants and white victims are treated more punitively than
cases with all other defendant/victim racial combinations.”12 Racial dis-
crimination in capital sentencing is therefore not merely a “historical” in-
justice. Rather, it persists into the present day.
The vastmajority of the academic literature frames this injustice as an
individual legal wrong. In other words, this literature assumes that if there
is an injustice here, it is a wrong suffered by those particular individuals
who engage with the capital punishment regime either as capital defen-
dants or as victims of murder.13 The debates within this literature thus fo-
cus largely on questions of retributive justice. For example, if a person’s
punishment is deserved, what moral difference does it make if other per-
sons equally deserving of that punishment receive a lesser (or greater)
punishment? Is a person (a blackmurder defendant, say) treated unjustly
if he ends up being executed for his crimes when others convicted of the12. David C. Baldus and George Woodworth, ”Race Discrimination in the Administra-
tion of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special Emphasis
on the Post-1990 Research,” Criminal Law Bulletin 39 (2003): 194–226.
13. See, e.g., Stephen Nathanson, “Does It Matter If the Death Penalty Is Arbitrarily
Administered?,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985): 149–64; Ernest van den Haag, “The
Ultimate Punishment: A Defense,” Harvard Law Review 99 (1986): 1662–69; Christopher
Meyers, “Racial Bias, the Death Penalty, and Desert,” Philosophical Forum 22 (1990): 139–
48; Patrick Lenta and Douglas Farland, “Desert, Justice, and Capital Punishment,” Criminal
Law and Philosophy 2 (2008): 273–90; and Matthew Kramer, The Ethics of Capital Punishment
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 313–24.
see Johnson et al., “Delaware Death Penalty.” For Illinois, see Michael L. Radelet and Glenn
L. Pierce, “The Role of Victim’s Race and Geography on Death Sentencing: Some Recent
Data from Illinois,” in From LynchMobs to the Killing State: Race and the Death Penalty in America,
ed. C. J. Ogletree and A. Sarat (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 117–49. For In-
diana, see Mary Ziemba-Davis et al., “The Application of Indiana’s Criminal Sentencing
Law: Findings of the Indiana Criminal Law Study Commission 123I” (2001). For Louisiana,
see Glenn L. Pierce andMichael L. Radelet, “Death Sentencing in East Baton Rouge Parish,
1990–2008,” Louisiana Law Review 71 (2011): 647–73. For Maryland, see Paternoster et al.,
“Justice by Geography and Race.” For New Mexico, see Wilson, “Application of the Death
Penalty in New Mexico.” For North Carolina, see Isaac Unah, “Empirical Analysis of Race
and the Process of Capital Punishment in North Carolina,” Michigan State Law Review,
2011, 609–58. For South Carolina, see Michael J. Songer and Issac Unah, “The Effect of
Race, Gender, and Location on Prosecutorial Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South
Carolina,” South Carolina Law Review 58 (2006): 161–209. For Tennessee, see Glenn Pierce,
Michael Radelet, and Raymond Paternoster, “Race and Death Sentencing in Tennessee,
1981–2000,” in American Bar Association, Evaluating Fairness and Accuracy in Death Sentencing
Systems: The Tennessee Death Penalty Assessment Report (2007). For Texas, see Phillips, “Racial
Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment.” For Virginia, see American Bar Associa-
tion Death Penalty Due Process Review Project, “Virginia Assessment on the Death Penalty”
(2013). For the armed forces, see David C. Baldus et al., “Racial Discrimination in the Admin-
istration of the Death Penalty: The Experience of the United States Armed Forces (1984–
2005),” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 101 (2011): 1227–1336.
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Asame crime would not have been executed (thanks to their race)? And if
so, how ought such comparative injustices be redressed?14
While we do not deny that issues of retributive legal justice are im-
portant in this context, we believe that this focus neglects an arguably
larger political injustice, one that illuminates the movement’s claim that
the American capital punishment regime wrongs black communities as a
whole. First, Cholbi’s arguments underscore how the capital punishment
regime wrongs members of the black community irrespective of their ac-
tual engagement with that regime. Consider the status of blacks as poten-
tial murder victims.15 Because would-be murderers are justified in believ-
ing that individuals who murder blacks are likely to face lesser costs (the
presumptively less severe punishments of prolonged or lifelong incarcer-
ation rather than execution) than they would for murdering individuals
of other races, the law thus fails to penalize killings of blacks in a manner
consistent with their having the equal protection of the law. The injustice
in question is one that all blacks face, not only those who actually aremur-
dered (or are victims ofmurder by dint of being a familymember of a black
murder victim, etc.). All black Americans thus inhabit a normative reality
that protects their lives less than white lives. Second, Cholbi argues that,
with respect to their status as potential capital defendants, blacks are jus-
tified in believing that the criminal justice system will subject them to a
greater “cost” for conviction (execution rather than thepresumptively less
severe punishments of prolonged or lifelong incarceration, say) because
of their race.16 These expectations, in turn, entail that blacks are not ac-
corded “equal status” under the law because they face an increased likeli-
hood of suffering a greater cost than others would owing to factors (i.e.,
race) unrelated to objective desert. The law thus penalizes blacks engag-
ing in murder in a manner inconsistent with their having equal status un-
der the law. Note again that the injustice in question— blacks not being
accorded equal status under the law—is one that all blacks face, not only
those who actually become capital defendants.
Cholbi’s arguments thus invite us to see the racial wrongs of Amer-
ican capital punishment less in terms of retributive wrongs done to par-
ticular defendants as a result of their race and more in terms of distrib-14. Benjamin S. Yost, “What’s Wrong with Differential Punishment?,” Utilitas 29 (2017):
257–85, provides an excellent overview of these questions and the disputes surrounding
them. Yost makes the case that race-based disparities in punishment reinforce structural
oppression in ways that are distinctively retributively unjust. We are sympathetic with his
proposal but do not take retributive considerations to exhaust the racial injustices in the
US criminal justice system.
15. Cholbi, “Race, Capital Punishment, and the Cost of Murder,” 267–69.
16. Ibid., 262.
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Autive injustices done to blacks as a class. On this analysis, the wrongs at
issue are that two crucial political goods the law (understood here to en-
compass not just statutory law, legal doctrine, secondary rules, etc., but
also the concrete functioning of the courts, law enforcement, etc.) is re-
sponsible for “distributing” are unjustly distributed on the basis of race.17
Black murder defendants are not extended the same legal status as other
defendants; they are presumed less innocent than defendants of other
racial groups. Black victims of murder are not extended the same legal
protection as victims of other races; their killers are presumed more in-
nocent than those who kill members of other racial groups. The injus-
tices wrought by racial bias in American capital sentencing are therefore
exhausted neither by the wrongs done to black defendants sentenced to
die owing (in part) to their race nor by the wrongs done to black victims
of murder whose murderers escape the death penalty (in part) owing to
the race of the victims. The injustices are also political, extending (as the
movement maintains) to the black community as a whole, because the
capital sentencing regime generates normative realities in which blacks
are not treated as equals.
We contend that the mere fact that the law does not accord blacks
equal standing as either potential murderers or potential murder victims
is sufficient on its own to constitute a serious racial injustice. Yet the in-
justice is not exhausted by what might appear to be abstract or “formal”
wrongs related to legal standing; these wrongsmake concrete differences
in the lives of black individuals and communities. Here we observe that
law can shape the substantive normative realities under which individu-
als live independently of their tangible and specific interactions with the
law. The law is a system that shapes attitudes, choices, and relationships.
Consider, for instance, a legal regime that criminalizes same-sex conduct
or relations. Such a regime shapes the attitudes, choices, and relation-
ships of those who live under it even if they never directly interact with
the regime in that respect. Under such a regime, individuals will try to pur-
sue same-sex relations only in private, businesses catering to a gay clientele
will take steps to conceal that fact or to evade legal scrutiny, employers who
discover that their employees are gay acquire additional leverage over
them, landlordsmay “harbor” such individuals or use the law to deny them
housing, and so on. Such effects are likely to arise even among those who
are never charged with violating the statutes against same-sex conduct.
The law thus creates a penumbra of normative realities—a set of atti-17. TheMovement for Black Lives Platform does not typically employ the idiom of “dis-
tribution” to characterize the group-based injustices suffered by African Americans, refer-
ring instead to violations of rights, structural oppression, exploitation, andmarginalization.
We consider the extent to which our normative analysis of US capital punishmentmaps onto
the movement’s general conception of racial injustice in Sec. VII.
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Atudes, expectations, and so on—that extend well beyond its tangible op-
erations. Hence, the law can create widespread substantive political injus-
tices, injustices produced by but not reducible to whatever specific legal
injustices the regime may commit.
In a similar vein, US blacks operate under a capital punishment re-
gime that creates unjust normative realities that exist independently of
their specific interactions with that regime. US blacks, even those who are
neither charged withmurder nor victimized bymurder, are (or are certainly
in a position to be) aware of how they would be treated by the law were
either of those events to occur. But just as with the criminalization of same-
sex relations, blacks’ awareness of how they are treated by the capital pun-
ishment regime is likely to adversely influence the attitudes and behaviors
that shape their interactionswith others. For example, this awareness likely
contributes to violence against blacks.Given that the regime routinely pun-
ishes those who kill blacks less harshly than those who kill others, killing
blacks becomes commensurably less risky (especially if the killer is white).
This reality is likely to negatively affect blacks’ interactions with, and will-
ingness to call upon, law enforcement. As phenomena such as black par-
ents giving their children “the talk” about how to safely deal with police
and the daughter of Philando Castile’s fiancée pleading with her mother
not to scream for fear that she would “get shooted” illustrate,18 the black
community lives under the shadow of American legal practices, of which
capital punishment has historically been an integral part, that assign their
lives lesser value. One adverse effect of this awareness is blacks’ greater an-
imosity toward law enforcement, rooted in the knowledge that violence
against them is less likely to be subject to the harshest sanction our legal
system permits. Blacks’ skepticism about law enforcement’s willingness to
protect their lives likely contributes to greater possession or use of weap-
ons, and hence higher levels of violence, among blacks. In turn, these fac-
tors increase the probability of lethal violence toward blacks and of crime
within black communities. Conversely, one might expect that discrimina-
tion related to offenders’ racewould counteract this effect. After all, if black
offenders aremore likely tobeexecuted thanothers, wemight expect aware-
ness of that fact to discourage murders by (and to some extent, among)
blacks. This may be so, but we suspect that the realities aremore complex.
For one, agents do not always respond so straightforwardly to the law’s in-
centives.19 Moreover, awareness of these facts regarding race of perpetra-
tors may equally well contribute to a kind of nihilism, that is, faced with a18. Taylor Pittman, “Inside theHeartbreaking Talk Black ParentsMust Have with Their
Kids,”Huffington Post, November 4, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/inside-the
-heartbreaking-talk-black-parents-must-have-with-their-kids_us_581ca092e4b0d9ce6fbb465b.
19. For elaboration of this point, in the context of individual and collective responses
to racial profiling, see Jack Glaser, Suspect Race: Causes and Consequences of Racial Profiling
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), chap. 5.
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Alegal regime that one has reason to think discriminates against blacks,
blacks may respond not by calibrating their behaviors to the disincentives
that regime produces but by treating that legal regime as an arbitrary and
unpredictable dispenser of sanctions.20
No doubt the adverse normative realities we reference here are not
caused exclusively by capital punishment, and the realities create attitudes
and expectations that interact in nuancedways. But nomatter. For we con-
sider it probable that racial discrimination against blacks in the adminis-
tration of the death penalty (both as prospective murder victims and as
prospectivemurderers) contributes to normative realities thatmotivate vi-
olence, increase community tension, and exacerbatemistrust, particularly
toward law enforcement.21
We have argued that the movement is therefore correct in seeing the
injustices stemming from racial discrimination in the administrationof cap-
ital punishment in the United States as collective or political. Still, several
key questions remain. We have not investigated the mechanisms through
which these injustices arise. We argue in the next section that implicit ra-
cial biases partly explain how these injustices occur, a fact that shapes both
how we understand the nature of these injustices and the defensibility of
various responses to them.
II
Implicit racial biases likely influence countless decisionsmade by witnesses,
police, attorneys, judges, and juries, such that blacks can, as a class, reason-
ably expect to be mistreated, devalued, and less protected by the capital
punishment regime, relative to whites.22 Before reviewing key evidence,20. It has long been disputed whether capital punishment has a deterrent effect on
crimes such as murder. For a useful overview of this evidence and the surrounding debate,
see John J. Donohue and Justin Wolfers, “Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the
Death Penalty Debate,” Stanford Law Review 58 (2005): 791–845. As Donohue and Wolfers
conclude, “the U.S. data simply do not speak clearly about whether the death penalty has a
deterrent or antideterrent effect” (843), but what evidence exists for it being a deterrent
effect suggests that it is small in comparison to other factors that influence murder rates
(“the death penalty does not cause or eliminate large numbers of homicides”; 844). We
take the considerations advanced in this paragraph to suggest that racial discrimination
could well undermine whatever deterrent effect capital punishment has and, at the very
least, complicates our ability to make sound inferences about its deterrent effects. Indeed,
it may be a further advantage of the abolition we advocate in this article that it would en-
able disputes about the deterrent effect to be more decisively settled.
21. For a recent survey highlighting blackmistrust toward police, see Pew Research Cen-
ter, “The Racial Confidence Gap in Police Performance,” September 29, 2016, http://assets
.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/09/ST_2016.09.29_Police-Final.pdf.
22. For further theoretical analysis of implicit racial bias, capital punishment, andother
aspects of the criminal justice system, including policing and eyewitness identification, see
CharlesOgletree, Robert J. Smith, and JohannaWald, “Coloring Punishment: Implicit Social
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Atwo caveats are in order. First, recent political events havemade it clear that
reports of the demise of explicit bigotry in liberal democracies have been
greatly exaggerated. Accordingly, we make no assumptions about the ex-
tent to which the “implicit” biases found in these studies are unconscious,
unintentional, or simply unspoken. That is, in many of the field- and lab-
based studies reviewed here, individuals act in predictably biased ways de-
spite verbally reporting that they are unbiased. As far as we are concerned,
these individuals might be concealing their conscious, intentional racism,
or theymight be sincerely egalitarian. We are neutral regarding such ques-
tions, and we refer to these biases as “implicit” simply because they go un-
reported.23 Second, we do not argue that these biases constitute the sole
cause of racial injustices related to capital punishment. A complex and en-
tangled set of factors, both internal and external to the criminal justice sys-
tem, are likely involved. For example, many police departments appear to
allocate disproportionate time and resources to levying fines and seizing
assets in black communities (i.e., overpolicing in order to garner revenue
to fund local government operations) and, as a direct consequence, have
fewer resources to devote to solving violent crimes in those communities
(therefore underpolicing when it comes to actually protecting black citi-
zens).24 We claim only that such structural factors do not by themselves23. For more on the nature of implicit racial bias and defenses of the predictive value of
indirectmeasures like the Implicit AssociationTest, see AlexMadva, “Implicit Bias,Moods, and
Moral Responsibility,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming), https://doi.org/10.1111
/papq.12212; Michael Brownstein and Alex Madva, “Stereotypes, Prejudice, and the Taxon-
omy of the Implicit Social Mind,” Noûs (forthcoming), https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12182;
and Michael Brownstein, Alex Madva, and Bertram Gawronski, “Understanding Implicit Bias:
How the Critics Miss the Point” (unpublishedmanuscript). Cf. Frederick L. Oswald et al., “Pre-
dicting Ethnic and Racial Discrimination: A Meta-analysis of IAT Criterion Studies,” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 105 (2013): 171–92; AnthonyG. Greenwald,Mahzarin R. Banaji,
and Brian A. Nosek, “Statistically Small Effects of the Implicit Association Test Can Have Soci-
etally Large Effects,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 108 (2015): 553–61; and B. Keith
Payne, Heidi A. Vuletich, and Kristjen B. Lundberg, “The Bias of Crowds: How Implicit Bias
Bridges Personal and Systemic Prejudice,” Psychological Inquiry 28 (2017): 233–48.
24. See, e.g., Rebecca Goldstein, Michael W. Sances, and Hye Young You, “Over-policing,
Under-policing, or Both? An Analysis of Police Resource Allocation” (unpublished manuscript);
see also the Movement for Black Lives Platform’s “invest-divest” demands. For the criticism
Cognition and Criminal Justice,” in Implicit Racial Bias across the Law, ed. Justin D. Levinson
and Robert J. Smith (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2012), 45–60; Robert J. Smith
andG.BenCohen, “Choosing Life orDeath (Implicitly),” in Implicit Racial Bias across the Law,
ed. Justin D. Levinson and Robert J. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012),
229–43; Glaser, Suspect Race ; Katherine B. Spencer, Amanda K. Charbonneau, and Jack Gla-
ser, “Implicit Bias and Policing,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 10 (2016): 50–63;
Joshua Correll et al., “The Police Officer’s Dilemma: A Decade of Research on Racial Bias
in the Decision to Shoot,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 8 (2014): 201–13; Bruce
W. Behrman and Sherrie L. Davey, “Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An
Archival Analysis,” Law and Human Behavior 25 (2001): 475–91.
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Asuffice to account for the injustice in question, and that given the persis-
tence of implicit bias and the persistence of racial injustice even after
post-Furman reforms, no (feasible) package of reforms short of abolition
will suffice to eliminate the injustices of capital punishment.
Research suggests that most white Americans, and even many black
Americans, harbor antiblack implicit biases, many of which are obviously
relevant to criminal justice.25 These biases lead individuals to judge that
darker-skinned individuals look angrier and more threatening than lighter-
skinned individuals with identical facial expressions.26 Whites tend to be
less sensitive to the pain experienced by blacks.27 Whites are more likely to
see blacks in some contexts as physically “superhuman” and in other con-
texts as subhuman and apelike.28 Even images of five-year-old black boys
automatically call to mind problematic racial stereotypes.29 It is not hard
to imagine how these biases could lead to the systematic mistreatment of
blacks relative to whites in capital contexts, and a significant body of re-
search specifically suggests that prosecutors, judges, and juries are just as
susceptible to these biases as everyone else.
Bias is especially likely to affect individuals when they lack clear-cut
guidelines or structural constraints to hold them accountable for their
decisions. Among the many subjective, institutionally unconstrained de-
cisions regularly made by prosecutors, some of the most relevant, for our
purposes, arewhether to charge andwhat sentence to seek, but alsowhether
to disclose mitigating or potentially exonerating evidence to the defense,25. See, e.g., Brian A. Nosek et al., “Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes
and Stereotypes,” European Review of Social Psychology 18 (2007): 36–88. For a review of “mean-
ingful life outcomes” predicted by implicit attitudes, see Irene V. Blair, Nilanjana Dasgupta,
and Jack Glaser, “Implicit Attitudes,” in APA Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 1,
Attitudes and Social Cognition, ed. Mario Mikulincer et al. (Washington, DC: American Psycho-
logical Association, 2015), 665–91.
26. Kurt Hugenberg and Galen V. Bodenhausen, “Facing Prejudice: Implicit Preju-
dice and the Perception of Facial Threat,” Psychological Science 14 (2003): 640–43; J. R. Sha-
piro et al., “Following in the Wake of Anger: When Not Discriminating Is Discriminating,”
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 35 (2009): 1356–67.
27. Sophie Trawalter, Kelly M. Hoffman, and Adam Waytz, “Correction: Racial Bias in
Perceptions of Others’ Pain,” PLOS ONE 11 (2016): e0152334.
28. A. Waytz, K. M. Hoffman, and S. Trawalter, “A Superhumanization Bias in Whites’
Perceptions of Blacks,” Social Psychological and Personality Science 6 (2015): 352–59; Phillip
AtibaGoff et al., “Not YetHuman: Implicit Knowledge,HistoricalDehumanization, andCon-
temporary Consequences,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 94 (2008): 292–306.
29. A. R. Todd, K. C. Thiem, and R. Neel, “Does Seeing Faces of Young Black Boys Fa-
cilitate the Identification of Threatening Stimuli?,” Psychological Science 27 (2016): 384–93.
that implicit bias discourse is insufficiently attentive to these structural-institutional concerns,
see Ralph Richard Banks and Richard Thompson Ford, “(How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter:
Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality,” Emory Law Journal 58 (2009): 1053–1152; Sally Has-
langer, “Social Structure, Narrative, and Explanation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2015):
1–15.
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Ahow to describe defendants and their actions in cross-examinations and
closing arguments, and so on.30 Such biases may even lead detectives and
prosecutors to devote fewer resources to obtaining evidence when there
are minority victims, thereby making cases with white victims seem more
serious on average than those with minority victims. Thus, a Louisiana
study found that prosecutor case files were significantly thicker when vic-
tims were white women, and thinnest when victims were black, which in
turn correlated with severer sentences for those convicted of killing whites
and women.31
One study found that professional lawyers’ decisions in a simulated
voir dire reflected the implicit (but not self-reported) biases of jurors.32 At-
torneys randomly assigned to be prosecutors tended to exclude jurors with
comparatively weak implicit racial biases.33 In other words, professional at-
torneys are somehow, consciously or unconsciously, tracking the implicit
biases of potential jurors and striking them partly on this basis. Attorneys
will, of course, inevitably be able to cite ostensibly nonracial reasons to jus-
tify such decisions—making the influence of implicit bias in this sphere
particularly difficult to combat, short of removing the option to strike ju-
rors altogether.34
Once selected, jurors’ implicit biases likely lead them to find the tes-
timony of black defendants, victims, and their families less credible and
sympathetic than their white counterparts.35 Mock jurors are more likely30. Robert J. Smith and Justin D. Levinson, “The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion,” Seattle University Law Review 35 (2012): 795–826.
31. Glenn L. Pierce et al., “Race and the Construction of Evidence in Homicide Cases,”
American Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (2014): 771–86.
32. M. Morrison, A. DeVaul-Fetters, and B. Gawronski, “Stacking the Jury: Legal Pro-
fessionals’ Peremptory Challenges Reflect Jurors’ Levels of Implicit Race Bias,” Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin 42 (2016): 1129–41.
33. Attorneys randomly assigned to be defenders tended to exclude jurors with stron-
ger implicit racial biases.
34. Samuel R. Sommers andMichael I. Norton, “Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge
Procedure,” Law and Human Behavior 31 (2007): 261–73.
35. We know of no experimental evidence directly related to antiblack biases in assess-
ments of credibility (i.e., testimonial injustice; see Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power
and the Ethics of Knowing [Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 2007]), but several studies point to
such biases against other ethnic groups, including Latinx individuals in the United States and
Turkish immigrants in Germany. See Galen V. Bodenhausen and Meryl Lichtenstein, “Social
Stereotypes and Information-Processing Strategies: The Impact of Task Complexity,” Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology 52 (1987): 871–80; Arnd Florack, Martin Scarabis, and Her-
bert Bless, “Der Einfluß wahrgenommener Bedrohung auf die Nutzung automatischer
Assoziationen bei der Personenbeurteilung [The impact of perceived threat on the use of
automatic associations in person judgments],” Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie 32 (2001):
249–59; Laura P.Minero andRuss K. E. Espinoza, “The Influence of Defendant Immigration
Status, Country ofOrigin, and Ethnicity on Juror Decisions: AnAversive RacismExplanation
for Juror Bias,” Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 38 (2016): 55–74; Larry R. Nelson, Mar-
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Ato remember “aggressive” details of a crime, and even to falsely remember
such details, when defendants are black.36 They are more likely to think
that the conviction of a black defendant remains appropriate despite the
use of inadmissible evidence.37 One field study even found that jurors were
more likely to report that the love, grief, and loss experienced by amurder
victims’ family were important factors in their decision-making when the
victim was white.38 Several experimental studies tie these discriminatory
patterns directly to measures of implicit racial bias, such as mock jurors’
automatic associations of black faces with the word “guilty.”39
Although juror bias likely affects conviction and sentencing trends
throughout the criminal justice system, it seems especially pernicious in
capital contexts.40 For example, the jurors most likely to be selected in
capital cases also seem more likely to implicitly devalue black lives.41 One
study found that individuals tended to associate whites with words like
“value” and “merit” and blacks with words like “expendable” and “worth-
less,” and that this tendency was especially strong among those who re-36. Justin Levinson, “Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering,” Duke Law Journal 57 (2007): 345–424.
37. Gordon Hodson et al., “Aversive Racism in Britain: The Use of Inadmissible Evi-
dence in Legal Decisions,” European Journal of Social Psychology 35 (2005): 437–48; James D.
Johnson et al., “Justice Is Still Not Colorblind: Differential Racial Effects of Exposure to
Inadmissible Evidence,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 21 (1995): 893–98. In fact,
participants in the study by Johnson et al. falsely believed that they were less influenced by
the inadmissible evidence when defendants were black. For further studies on juror bias,
see Ellen S. Cohn et al., “Reducing White Juror Bias: The Role of Race Salience and Racial
Attitudes,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 39 (2009): 1953–73; Danielle M. Young, Justin
D. Levinson, and Scott Sinnett, “Innocent until Primed: Mock Jurors’ Racially Biased Re-
sponse to the Presumption of Innocence,” PLOS ONE 9 (2014): e92365.
38. David R. Karp and Jarrett B. Warshaw, “Chapter 15, Their Day in Court: The Role
of Murder Victims’ Families in Capital Juror Decision Making,” inWounds That Do Not Bind:
Victim-Based Perspectives on the Death Penalty, ed. James R. Acker and David R. Karp (Durham,
NC: Carolina Academic, 2006), 275–95. Such findings are especially disheartening because
families of white victims are nearly twice as likely to testify in the first place.
39. Justin D. Levinson,Huajian Cai, andDanielle Young, “Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias:
The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 8 (2010):
187–208; Justin D. Levinson and Danielle Young, “Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Im-
plicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence,” West Virginia Law Review 112
(2010): 307–50.
40. For reviews of juror bias, see Jennifer S. Hunt, “Race, Ethnicity, and Culture in Jury
Decision Making,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 11 (2015): 269–88; Mona Lynch
and Craig Haney, “Looking across the Empathic Divide: Racialized Decision Making on
the Capital Jury,” Michigan State Law Review, 2011, 573–607.
41. Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith, and Danielle M. Young, “Devaluing Death: An
Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States,”
New York University Law Review 89 (2014): 513–78.
garet L. Signorella, and Karin G. Botti, “Accent, Gender, and Perceived Competence,” His-
panic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 38 (2016): 166–85.
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Aported being willing to convict someone even if that meant a potential
death sentence. In fact, this implicit devaluation of blacks relative to whites
predicted mock jurors’ decisions to sentence a black convict to death in-
stead of life in prison.42 This bias may help to explain why, when victims
are white, defendants who look more stereotypically black are also more
likely to receive a death sentence.43
Nor does racial bias cease at the moment of conviction. Rather than
serving as final bulwarks against discrimination, post-conviction proce-
dures in capital cases may simply create more opportunities for bias to
shape outcomes. Since judges—like everyone else—tend to be biased,44
white defendants may be more likely to get sentence relief than black de-
fendants.45 Therefore, even if these procedures are valuable for the broader
aim of reducing unjust capital punishments, they may actually exacerbate
race-based disparities. In any event, in states where judges are elected, they
must appear “tough on crime” and therefore largely tend to uphold cap-
ital sentencing on appeals from lower courts.46
Remarkably, one study found that white respondents became more
supportive of capital punishment when informed about racial bias in cap-
ital sentencing.47 Another study, by Glaser et al., found that when themax-
imum possible sentence was life without parole, mock jurors were equally
likely to recommend convicting black and white defendants (67.7% and42. They also found that the refusal to sentence someone to death led to the exclu-
sion of nonwhite jurors, and that the death qualification process therefore exacerbated
the impact of racial bias on capital sentencing. Notably, their participant sample was drawn
from six of the most active death penalty states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida,
Oklahoma, and Texas. Moreover, “those who are more likely to be allowed to serve on
death penalty cases are not only more likely to harbor racially prejudiced attitudes, but also
are more likely to favor the conviction of innocent defendants over letting guilty ones go
free.” Robert L. Young, “Guilty until Proven Innocent: Conviction Orientation, Racial At-
titudes, and Support for Capital Punishment,” Deviant Behavior 25 (2004): 151–67; cf. Mark
Peffley and Jon Hurwitz, “The Racial Components of ‘Race-Neutral’ Crime Policy Atti-
tudes,” Political Psychology 23 (2002): 59–75.
43. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., “Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of
Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes,” Psychological Science 17 (2006):
383–86.
44. On racial bias among judges, see Ozkan Eren and Naci Mocan, “Emotional Judges
and Unlucky Juveniles” (working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, Septem-
ber 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22611; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., “Does Uncon-
scious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?,” Notre Dame Law Review 84 (2009): 1195–1246.
45. Michelle A. Petrie and James E. Coverdill, “Who Lives and Dies on Death Row?
Race, Ethnicity, and Post-sentence Outcomes in Texas,” Social Problems 57 (2010): 630–52.
46. Paul Brace and Brent D. Boyea, “State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the
Practice of Electing Judges,” American Journal of Political Science 52 (2008): 360–72.
47. Mark Peffley and Jon Hurwitz, “Persuasion and Resistance: Race and the Death
Penalty in America,” American Journal of Political Science 51 (2007): 996–1012. Cf. Rebecca
C. Hetey and Jennifer L. Eberhardt, “Racial Disparities in Incarceration Increase Accep-
tance of Punitive Policies,” Psychological Science 25 (2014): 1949–54.
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A66.7%, respectively); however, when the maximum possible sentence was
death, participants became simultaneously less likely to convict whites
(55.1%) and more likely to convict blacks (80%).48 Note that these results
are inconsistent with the intuitive and widely held view (articulated, e.g., in
the Supreme Court’s ruling inMcCleskey v. Kemp) that racial bias is insensi-
tive to the context or the stakes. Glaser and colleagues’ findings, together
with the bodyof evidence reviewed in this section, suggest that the interplay
between racial bias, capital punishment, and other patterns of unfairness in
the criminal justice system is more complex. In this case, otherwise-equal
rates of conviction for whites and blacks (when the maximum sentence
is life imprisonment) become stunningly unequal simply by introducing
the death penalty as a possibility. Such results suggest that capital punish-
ment is not just another arena infected with bias but instead represents a
distinctive channel for racial discrimination, in at least two respects. First,
the possibility of a capital sentencemay function as a powerful contextual
cue that both activates and amplifies the effects of specific antiblack biases,
and second, the bias-amplifying power of capital contexts is not restricted
to capital-sentencing contexts, distorting also mock jurors’ judgments of
guilt, assessments of evidence, and willingness to convict. The cognitive
salience of execution as anultimate outcomemay, then, cast a broad shadow
over the perception and treatment of black defendants (and killers of
white victims) throughout the criminal justice system, influencing rates
of conviction, charging decisions, public support for punitive policies,
police uses of force, mistrust of criminal justice within the black commu-
nity, and so on. (We will circle back to these hypotheses when we respond
to objections in Sec. VI.)
At this point, we can only speculate about the mechanisms render-
ing capital contexts distinctively discriminatory. We suspect that many of
the aforementioned biases play a role: the reflexive devaluation of black
lives; the implicit denial that black defendants, victims, and families feel
pain, love, and loss; and the broader tendencies to perceive blacks as threat-
ening, guilty, and variously super- or subhuman.Glaser and colleagues spec-
ulate that the sheer salience of the death penalty as a live option might
interact with implicit racial prejudices and stereotypes to make crimes
committed by black defendants (or crimes committed against white vic-
tims) seem especially brutal. In other words, for many, black Americans
do not deserve to die because of the gravity of their crimes; rather, at least
in part, their crimes are particularly grave because black Americans com-
mit them. Likewise, those who kill black Americans are found not to be
worthy of death not because of the lesser gravity of their crimes; rather,48. Jack Glaser, Karin D. Martin, and Kimberly B. Kahn, “Possibility of Death Sentence
Has Divergent Effect on Verdicts for Black and White Defendants,” Law and Human Behav-
ior 39 (2015): 539–46.
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Aat least in part, their crimes become less grave by virtue of having killed
black Americans.
III
To this point, we have argued for two principal claims: first, that black
communities in theUnitedStates suffer a distributive injusticedue toAmer-
ican legal practices surrounding capital punishment, an injustice wherein
they are not accorded equal status under the law, nor accorded its equal
protection; and second, that the patterns of racial discrimination respon-
sible for this injustice cannot be adequately explained without reference
to implicit racial bias.
Remaining, however, are the further questions of whether these pat-
terns ought to be remedied and, if so, what the best remedy is. In takingup
these questions, we do not consider “backward-looking” remedies whose
rationale is to redress the past injustices associated with these patterns.
While we believe that past discrimination in capital sentencing merits
moral attention and perhaps recompense, our focus instead falls on rem-
edies that address the present (and future) state of affairs in which black
Americans as a class suffer injustice due to the law’s failure to extend equal
status and protection to them. Past discrimination is relevant to our con-
cerns only insofar as it helps explain present discriminatory patterns and
predict future ones.
Why do present-day patterns of racial discrimination morally de-
mand a remedy? What wrong is committed if no remedy is offered? Such
patterns, we have argued, devalue black lives by failing to extend basic le-
gal protections to them, regardless of whether black individuals engage
with the capital punishment regime either as defendants or as victims.
These patterns cannot be adequately explained without reference to both
general biases about blacks being criminal or threatening and biases likely
to be triggered specifically within capital trials or sentencing. These pat-
terns are therefore neither “arbitrary” in the sense of being capricious or
unpredictable nor due to systematic intentional discrimination against
blacks. But arbitrariness and intentional discrimination are not the only
institutional facts that call for remedy. Indeed, to allow such patterns to
persist would constitute a form of institutional or societal recklessness.
A person acts recklessly when she knows (or should have known) that
her act will likely cause harm but proceeds to perform that act anyway
without due concern for the justifiability of risking harm to others. When
recklessness results in harm, the actor can be justifiably held culpable for
that harm because the harm is the direct product of her having knowingly
engaged in risky behavior. An intoxicated driver, for example, knows (or
should know) that her driving increases the risk of injury or death to
others but proceeds to drive anyway. When her driving results in injuryThis content downloaded from 134.071.247.199 on March 17, 2018 14:26:00 PM
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Aor death to others, she is thereby culpable for that harm. This is the case
even though (a) the act of driving while intoxicated did not guarantee
that others would be harmed, but rather merely increased the likelihood
of such harm, and (b) she did not intend to harm inasmuch as she did not
drive while intoxicated so that she could harm someone else, nor was
harming someone else an essential component of her achieving her ends
through her acts. The reckless actor is culpable because and to the extent
that the harms resulting from her acts are reasonably foreseeable.
Racial discrimination in capital sentencing cannot be easily traced to
a single individual actor. Nevertheless, with respect to such discrimina-
tion, our society and its legal system now stand in an equivalent position
to the individual considering whether to drive while intoxicated. Our so-
ciety and its legal system recognize (or should recognize) that continuing
with capital punishment practices carries substantial risk of failing to treat
black Americans as equals with respect to legal status and the law’s protec-
tions. While ignorance of this risk and how it comes about thanks to im-
plicit bias may have excused our society and its legal system in the past,
that excuse no longer holds water. To accede to the capital punishment
status quo thus involves an unjustifiable risk-taking with respect to legal
equality. That the system and its participants do not intend to wrong black
defendants ormurder victims, as well as typically opposing the racial wrongs
in question, therefore does not exculpate them frommoral responsibility
for those wrongs. Furthermore, that the system and its participants do not
intend the political wrongs to which we have referred does not exculpate
them from those wrongs either. And given that there are remedies at hand
to prevent these wrongs,mere regret at the negative effects of such contin-
ued institutional recklessness is woefully inadequate.
IV
We turn now to the question of what shape the remedy for this injustice
should have. The best remedy will meet two desiderata. First, it will dimin-
ish the injustice in question, either by eliminating the bias that generates
it or by nullifying the effects of that bias. Second, the remedy itself will
not be unjust.
One proposal, which we reject, is that discrimination in capital pun-
ishment can be rooted out through sentencing reform alone. As noted
earlier, after the Furman decision, states implemented a number of re-
forms tomake capital sentencing fairer, reforms which (courts ruled) ren-
dered state capital punishment statutes fair enough to pass constitutional
scrutiny. But these reforms were not race conscious. Rather, they were
aimed at diminishing the latitude that judges or juries have in applying
the death penalty so as to make its application less “wanton” or arbitrary.
Might additional procedural reforms, perhaps including reforms explic-This content downloaded from 134.071.247.199 on March 17, 2018 14:26:00 PM
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Aitly designed to address racial bias, eliminate the racially discriminatory
patterns in American capital punishment practices?
We are skeptical. As the evidence adduced in Section I suggests, pre-
vious procedural reforms have done little to eliminate the discriminatory
patterns in question.49 Some studies, for example, find that efforts to en-
courage jurors to more seriously consider mitigating evidence have had
no effect on their sentencing decisions.50 This makes a prima facie case
against additional procedural reforms satisfying our first desideratum.
Still, onemight think that reforms reducing discretion in capital sentenc-
ing could prove effective. In a recent defense of capital punishment, Mat-
thew Kramer proposes that the death penalty be reserved only for crimes
of “extreme gravity” that are “defilingly evil.”51 When a person has “perpe-
trated grotesque inequities that besmirch the moral standing of the com-
munity” of which she is a member, a “community is under a moral obliga-
tion to resort to capital punishment” as a way of “purging” itself of this
evil, according to Kramer.52 By limiting capital punishment only to those
whose crimes “defile” the community, Kramer’s “purgative” rationale for
the death penalty might suitably limit those subject to it so as to eliminate
racially discriminatory patterns in its administration.
In our estimation, Kramer’s proposal runs afoul of both desiderata.
As a generalmatter, Kramer is right to note that racial bias ismore likely to
sway decision-making in ambiguous cases. For example, mock jurors’ im-
plicit biases lead them to interpret ambiguous evidence as more damning
when the defendant is dark-skinned than when light-skinned.53 Suppose,
then, that judges and juries abide by a Kramer-inspired principle and im-
pose the death penalty only on “defilingly evil” crimes. This will not affect
decisionsmadeby police, prosecutors, and so on, that occur prior to judge
or jury sentencing, decisions that (as we noted in Sec. II) are likely to be
swayed by implicit racial bias. That is, Kramer fails to appreciate the role
that bias can play in disambiguating cases, as when detectives and prose-
cutors devote more (vs. less) time and effort to turning up evidence when
victims are white (vs. black), thereby exerting systematic effects on how49. Richard C. Dieter, “Struck by Lightning: TheContinuing Arbitrariness of theDeath
Penalty Thirty-Five Years after Its Re-instatement in 1976,”Death Penalty InformationCenter
report, July 2011, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/StruckByLightning.pdf; and
Justice Breyer dissenting, Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. ___ (2015).
50. Elizabeth S. Vartkessian, Jon R. Sorensen, and Christopher E. Kelly, “Tinkering
with the Machinery of Death: An Analysis of Juror Decision-Making in Texas Death Penalty
Trials during Two Statutory Eras,” Justice Quarterly 34 (2017): 1–24.
51. Matthew Kramer, Ethics of Capital Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011), 225, 245.
52. Ibid., 228–29.
53. Levinson and Young, “Different Shades of Bias”; Levinson, Cai, and Young, “Guilty
by Implicit Racial Bias.”
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Aegregious a defendant’s crimes come to seem.54 Thus, this reform may
have minimal impact on racial discrimination in capital sentencing over-
all. Moreover, we doubt that judges and juries would abide by the Kramer-
inspired principle in a racially neutral matter. Whether a crime is “defil-
ingly evil” is itself a likely product of implicit bias. Mock jurors become
simultaneously more likely to convict blacks and less likely to convict
whites precisely when capital punishment is a possibility.55 Recall also that
the grief and pain expressed by victims’ families—factors which presum-
ably affect how “evil” a crime seems—are more likely to influence juror
decision-making when victims are white.56 Such considerations illustrate
that mere procedural reform would be both ineffective and unjust. (Of
course, the criminal justice system is replete with injustices, some of which
could be ameliorated through sentencing reforms, such as the elimina-
tion of harshmandatoryminimums. Our point is that procedural reforms
are, in the context of capital punishment, radically insufficient.)
A second alternative remedy would be to impose the death penalty
(a) only on (some) nonblack capital defendants but on no black defen-
dants, (b) only on (some of) those who kill blacks but on none of those
who kill nonblacks, or (c) both.57 This remedy has the obvious defect that
it then fails to accord nonblacks equal status under or the equal protec-
tion of the law.
A final possible remedy is entertained by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen:
defendants would receive a “death penalty lottery ticket where the risk of
losing varies between the two groups that are being discriminated be-
tween such that this differential risk eliminates the overrepresentation
of one of these groups within the relevant penal category.”58 For example,
to counteract racial discrimination throughout the capital punishment
regime, blacks and whites convicted of capital crimes might receive lot-
tery tickets with, respectively, 5 percent and 20 percent chances of receiv-
ing the death penalty instead of life imprisonment. This proposal might
seem especially well suited to combat the distributive comparative injus-
tices on which we have focused.59 However, Lippert-Rasmussen does not54. Pierce et al., “Race and the Construction of Evidence.”
55. Glaser, Martin, and Kahn, “Possibility of Death Sentence”; cf. Hetey and Eber-
hardt, “Racial Disparities in Incarceration.”
56. Karp andWarshaw, “Chapter 15, Their Day in Court”; on the insensitivity of whites
to blacks’ pain, see Trawalter, Hoffman, and Waytz, “Correction.”
57. Such a remedy might be attractive to those (unlike us) concerned with backward-
looking remedies aimed at ameliorating past racial injustice in capital sentencing.
58. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “Punishment and Discrimination,” in Punishment and
Ethics, ed. J. Ryberg and J. A. Corlett (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 2010), 169–88,
181–82.
59. Cory Aragon suggests that, given that this patently unjust scheme would success-
fully eliminate certain race-based distributive injustices, we have reason to conclude that
the underlying political injustices are not primarily distributive, but relational (for further
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Adefend this lottery as a legitimate option, and for good reason. To trade a
regime in which implicit racial bias results in race-based injustice for one
in which racial bias is explicitly encoded into sentencing hardly seems
like an improvement. Any scheme that explicitly took the race of partic-
ular defendants or victims into account with the aim of achieving propor-
tional distribution of capital punishment across racial groups would be
odious on its face. We assume, for example, that such a race-conscious
proposal would strike defenders of the death penalty as especially intol-
erable (indeed, less tolerable than abolition). Whatever gains this pro-
posal would make in terms of comparative justice would be outweighed
by losses in noncomparative (retributive) justice, such that final determi-
nations regarding who receives the death penalty versus life imprison-
ment would become almost entirely disconnected from the facts about
what particular individuals deserve. Certainly white defendants could
be forgiven for objecting that such a lottery scheme would fail to accord
them equal legal status, and whites and blacks alike might reasonably
raise a more generic comparative complaint, namely, that there is no ra-
tional basis for their being subjected to death while others are not. After
all, a lottery embodies the very “arbitrariness” in the allocation of the
death penalty that the Furman-era Court condemned.
V
Our proposed remedy is either the outright legal abolition of the death
penalty or its de facto suspension (a “permanent moratorium,” so to
speak). Such a remedy clearly satisfies our first desideratum. If capital
punishment does not occur, then racial bias cannot infect its implemen-
tation. Hence, abolition eliminates the racial discriminatory patterns in
capital sentencing and puts blacks and other Americans on equal foot-
ing with respect to their legal status and the protection of the law.
That our proposed remedy satisfies the second desideratum, of not
being unjust, is likely to meet resistance from capital punishment advo-
cates, especially those convinced of the irrelevance of comparative con-
siderations to the justness of punishment. Ernest van den Haag articu-
lates their stance forcefully:discus
based
ll use If and when discrimination occurs it should be corrected. Not, how-
ever, by letting the guilty blacks escape the death penalty because
guilty whites do, but by making sure that the guilty white offenders
suffer it as the guilty blacks do. Discrimination must be abolished
by abolishing discrimination—not by abolishing penalties. However,sion, see Sec. VII). However, this sort of proposal would also seem to counteract race-
relational inequality and oppression.
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All use even if . . . this cannot be done, I do not see any good reason to let any
guilty murderer escape his penalty. It does happen in the administra-
tion of criminal justice that one person gets away with murder and
another is executed. Yet the fact that one gets away with it is no reason
to let another one escape.60Though van denHaag refers here only to discrimination based on defen-
dant’s race, he would presumably argue in the same manner regarding
discrimination based on victim’s race, to wit, that when such discrimina-
tion occurs, it should be corrected. We ought not abolish capital punish-
ment because those whomurder blacksmore often escape the death pen-
alty than do those who murder nonblacks, for doing so merely enables
both classes to evade their just desserts. Abolition, on van den Haag’s
view, bars noncomparative retributive justice from being done, that is,
it prevents those who deserve to suffer death for their crimes from suffer-
ing what they ought. One would thereby anticipate that adherents of van
den Haag’s position would be no more enthusiastic about our rationale
for abolition than they were for prior efforts to justify abolition on the ba-
sis of racial discrimination. Prior efforts argued that considerations of
comparative retributive justice were sufficient to outweigh considerations
of noncomparative retributive justice—that the fact that blacks were sub-
ject to greater punishments than whites or that the murderers of blacks
were subject to lesser punishments than those who murdered members
of other races generated a comparative retributive injustice sufficient to
outweigh whatever losses in noncomparative justice the abolition of the
death penalty would effect.61 In keeping with the Black LivesMattermove-
ment’s understanding of the American capital punishment regime as
wronging black communities, we have focused not on the particular re-
tributive injustices suffered either by black capital defendants or by black
murder victims; rather, we rest our case for abolition on distributive injus-
tices done to the black community, namely, that thanks to that regime’s
discriminatory practices, blacks do not enjoy equal status under or the
equal protection of the law. But if adherents of a van den Haag–like posi-
tion are correct, then considerations of noncomparative (retributive) jus-
tice trump any considerations of comparative justice, whether retributive
or distributive. Hence, they would likely reject our rationale for abolition
on grounds similar to those used to reject prior race-based rationales.
We find the thesis that comparative considerations of justice, whether
retributive or distributive, must always take a back seat to noncomparative0. Ernest van den Haag and John P. Conrad, The Death Penalty: A Debate (Berlin:
ger, 1983), 223.
1. See, e.g., Thomas Hurka, “Desert: Individualistic and Holistic,” in Desert and Jus-
d. Serena Olsaretti (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 45–68; for discussion,
nta and Farland, “Desert, Justice and Capital Punishment,” 281–87.
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Aconsiderations implausible. VandenHaaghimself acknowledges that com-
parative considerations are at least morally relevant; upon discovering
thatmembers of some races tend to escape thedeathpenalty where others
suffer it for the same crime, we ought (he says) to seek to abolish such dis-
crimination. Comparative considerations count as moral reasons, on his
view. What van denHaag’s position denies is that such considerations ever
count as weighty enough reasons to forego any opportunity whatsoever
to give individuals what they ostensibly deserve from a noncomparative per-
spective. We reject the homogeneity of comparative considerations that this
position appears to entail. On this position, comparative considerations have
a roughly equal weight in overall determinations of justice, that is, a uni-
formly minute weight. But comparative considerations vary widely in their
force. On one end of the scale, some disproportions in the allocation of
punishments do not seem to call for any remedy. Hurka observes that
in almost every society some murders will not be solved and some murder-
ers will receive no punishment, but this fact is not sufficient to merit re-
thinking how we punish murders.62 Conversely, though, the racial dispro-
portions in the allocation of capital punishment in the United States fall
toward the weightier end of the scale of comparative wrongs. Hurka notes
that evils caused by the state are more objectionable than evils the state
merely permits,63 and as we argued in Section III, the United States is en-
gaging in a kind of knowing recklessness that causally effects the racial dis-
proportions in the allocation of capital punishment. In addition, the fact
that these disproportions burden a group (American blacks) that has been
historically disadvantaged owing to discrimination and prejudice adds to
the weightiness of these comparative considerations. Our judgments regard-
ing what individuals legally deserve should be guided by what they mor-
ally deserve, where what they morally deserve must take into account how
legal sanctions shape their lives overall. To ignore the racial dispropor-
tionality in capital sentencing is to allow this disproportionality to com-
pound the comparative wrongs American blacks suffer owing to other
forms of discrimination and prejudice. Thus, if any comparative consider-
ation is ever weighty enough such that its redress justifies reductions in
noncomparative justice, then racial disproportionality in capital sentenc-
ing is such a comparative consideration.
We therefore do not hold that noncomparative justice trumps com-
parative justice, whether retributive or distributive. Note, however, that
even if one accepts this implausible thesis about comparative justice,
van den Haag’s position still rests on the controversial stance that the ab-
olition of the death penalty involves a loss in retributive justice. But this
stance is open to objection. First, that stance assumes that the death pen-62. Hurka, “Desert,” 54.
63. Ibid., 55.
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Aalty is not an unjust punishment, that is, that it is one that polities aremor-
ally entitled to exact. We have largely assumed this for the sake of argu-
ment but recognize its contentiousness. Second, that position assumes
that the death penalty is a uniquely just punishment for crimes such as
murder—that no other punishment is sufficient to render unto those
who commit (say) murder what they deserve. But there is no special rea-
son to believe that for each and every crime or class thereof there is but
one punishment that those who commit that crime deserve or that those
who do not receive that specific punishment are not thereby given their
just deserts. We need not be “nihilists” about moral desert, denying that
there are any facts of the matter regarding what an offender deserves as a
result of his wrongdoing,64 to recognize that commensurability between
criminal acts and sanctions is almost certainly not a matter of one-to-one
correspondence. Third, epistemic doubts can be raised about the reli-
ability of judgments concerning the commensurability of punishment
and desert. For instance, we suspect that moral intuitions about which
specific crimes merit which punishments are themselves likely compro-
mised by racial (and other) biases. The research reviewed here indicates
the dim prospects of identifying some unbiased source of intuitions about
the precise requirements of noncomparative justice, or the relative geo-
metric weights of comparative versus noncomparative considerations.65
We assume that were the death penalty abolished, then the most se-
rious crimes would result in lifetime imprisonment with no possibility of
parole. Is it plausible that such imprisonment, given the wholesale depri-
vations of liberty and opportunity it involves, is insufficiently severe to
count as a just punishment for the most serious crimes—that any punish-
ment short of death is not harsh enough to count as a just punishment for
such crimes?We doubt that the geometry of desert is so precise or that our
judgments about that geometry should be uncritically relied on. The fact
that the suicide rate among prison inmates is three to four times greater
than the general US population suggests that the belief that death is al-
ways a worse fate than long-term imprisonment may well be wrong.66 At64. Russ Shafer-Landau, “Retributivism and Desert,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81
(2000): 189–214.
65. For samples of research on the wide array of psychological, cultural, and structural
determinants of intuitions about punitiveness, including additional references to racial
bias and capital punishment, see, e.g., Johnson’s finding that racial gaps in support for pu-
nitive policies reflect white prejudice toward blacks and black perceptions of injustice; Devon
Johnson, “Racial Prejudice, Perceived Injustice, and the Black-White Gap in Punitive Atti-
tudes,” Journal of Criminal Justice 36 (2008): 198–206. See also Shadd Maruna and Anna King,
“Once a Criminal, Always a Criminal? ‘Redeemability’ and the Psychology of Punitive Public
Attitudes,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 15 (2009): 7–24.
66. American Foundation for Suicide Prevention, “Suicide Statistics,” https://afsp.org
/about-suicide/suicide-statistics/, states that the annual suicide rate is 13.26 per 100,000 indi-
viduals. The US Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Mortality in Local Jails
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Athe very least, such facts indicate that if the worst crimes demand “hard
treatment,” imprisonment looks like hard treatment indeed and is likely
not unjust as a sanction for the most serious criminal acts.
Thus, we conclude that either comparative justice (and in particular,
comparative distributive justice related to the status and protection the
law accords to individuals based on their race) is relevant to justice over-
all, in which case abolition of the death penalty in response to distributive
injustice is defensible, or comparative justice is irrelevant to justice over-
all, but the case against abolition rests on controversial views concerning
the severity of different punishments and the geometry of wrongdoing
and desert.
On balance, then, we maintain that abolition fares better than alter-
native remedies in satisfying the two desiderata we identified. It elimi-
nates the effects of implicit racial bias that generate the racial injustices
at issue, and while its being a just remedy is more debatable, our remedy
clearly fares better in this respect than the most attractive alternatives.
VI
Two final worries about our abolitionist proposal merit attention.
Some may worry that it “proves too much.” The abolition of capital
punishment, one might hypothesize, will simply result in racial bias man-
ifesting itself in the application of the next most severe sentence, namely,
life imprisonment without parole. Black defendants would be more likely
to receive life imprisonment without parole for the same crimes, and those
who commit crimes against blacks, where such crimes are eligible for life
imprisonment without parole, would be less likely to be sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole. But if so, then the very considerations we
have adduced in favor of capital punishment would also seem to speak
in favor of abolishing life imprisonment: these discriminatory patterns
in life sentencing entail that blacks are neither extended the law’s equal
protections nor accorded equal status, and so on.Once life imprisonment
is abolished, then racial discrimination would recur at the next most se-
vere sentence, in turn calling for the abolition of that sentence. Taken
to its logical conclusion, our proposal might seem to entail not merely
the abolition of capital punishment but themore radical abolition of pun-
ishment altogether.6767. Lenta and Farland, “Desert, Justice, and Capital Punishment,” 283–85. For its
part, the Black Lives Matter movement would likely welcome these implications, inasmuch
as its platform calls for the abolition of incarceration altogether. While we harbor signifi-
cant reservations about the present American system of mass incarceration, we are less con-
vinced that eliminating prisons altogether is the wisest response to its deficiencies.
and State Prisons, 2000–2013—Statistical Tables,” https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf
/mljsp0013st.pdf, indicates that suicide rates in the incarcerated population have hovered
around 40 per 100,000 in recent years.
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AWegrant that these untoward implications would be problematic for
our position. However, we very much doubt that our position has these
implications. For recall that the mechanism behind racial discrimination
in capital sentencing, on our view, is implicit bias. And as we observed in
Section II, there are good reasons to think that the forms of implicit bias
responsible for racial discrimination in capital sentencing are very closely
associated with the application of death as a criminal sentence. Recall
that these biases include the belief that blacks are less sensitive to pain,
that the family members of blackmurder victims are accorded lesser sym-
pathy, that blacks are either “subhuman” or “superhuman,” and so on.
These specific biases suggest that antiblack biases are closely linked psy-
chologically with the infliction of bodily violence, that is, that blacks are
perceived to both suffer less harm from it and be more prone to inflict
it. Although such biases are apt to exert some influence across a variety
of contexts, for example, in police officers’ split-second decisions to use
force, or in clinicians’ deliberations about prescribing pain medication
to black patients,68 they are likely to be more salient in capital cases than
in cases that do not involve murder or capital punishment. Indeed, the
aforementioned study conducted byGlaser et al.,69 wherein the availability
of capital punishment (as opposed to life imprisonment) appears to lead
mock jurors to convict black defendants at a noticeably higher rate than
whites, strongly suggests that death and life imprisonment stand on oppo-
site sides of a salience boundary within implicit racial bias. Such findings
introduce the possibility that capital punishment is not simply another
manifestation of racial discrimination but a context that activates biases
that make such discrimination more likely, with cascading effects down-
ward into other aspects of the criminal justice system, such as conviction
rates, police use of force, mistrust of criminal justice in black communi-
ties, and so on. In other words, abolishing the death penalty may itself
be one amongmany necessary reforms for reducing broader racial dispar-
ities in criminal imprisonment.Of course, these are empirical hypotheses,
but so too is the speculation that racial bias willmanifest nomatter themost
severe punishment available. Proponents of capital punishment have, how-
ever, consistently treated this speculation as a truth deduced a priori. We
would certainly welcome a more empirically oriented approach, such as a
nationwide experiment to assess the multifarious effects of a death penalty
moratorium.
A secondworry is that our proposal leaves an unaccounted-for loss in
noncomparative justice. The abolition of the death penalty would place68. Astha Singhal, Yu-Yu Tien, and Renee Y. Hsia, “Racial-Ethnic Disparities in Opioid
Prescriptions at Emergency Department Visits for Conditions Commonly Associated with
Prescription Drug Abuse,” PLOS ONE 11 (2016): e0159224.
69. Glaser, Martin, and Kahn, “Possibility of Death Sentence.”
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Ablacks on equal terms with others with respect to legal status and to the
law’s protections, we have argued, and thus eliminate a large-scale com-
parative injustice. But it would apparently do so by introducing noncom-
parative injustice, because abolitionwould (a) reduce the costs that blacks
and nonblacks alike ought to face for murder below what it ought to be
and (b) fail to give blacks and nonblacks the level of legal protection that
they ought to enjoy. Equality in legal status or in the law’s protections thus
comes at the expense of adequate legal status or legal protection for all.
These losses in noncomparative justice could well outweigh the gains in
comparative justice that we have invoked in defense of abolition.70
Thisworry attributes to us a contentious claimwhichwedonot assert,
namely, that there is some quantum of legal status or legal protection to
which individuals are entitled that they will not receive under a system of
punishment that precludes capital punishment. While we largely concede
arguendo the retributivemerits of capital punishment, our argument con-
cerning the comparative injustice blacks face as a class owing to American
capital punishment practices does not rest on any noncomparative claims
about how much in the way of legal status or legal protection individuals
deserve. Admittedly, it is possible that abolition would result in a noncom-
parative injustice concerning legal status or legal protection. But that it
does, and that the magnitude of this noncomparative injustice would be
so great as to outweigh the gains in comparative justice that we have argued
would result from abolition, does not seem to follow from capital punish-
ment being in principle noncomparatively just. At the very least, our oppo-
nents bear the burden of providing an account of legal status and of the
law’s protections that entails that neither can be adequately provided un-
less individuals are subject to the death penalty.
VII
We have argued that understanding the racial wrongs of capital punish-
ment in political and distributive terms, rather than in terms of individ-
ual desert and retributive justice, further substantiates the movement’s
controversial claim that the death penalty, by virtue of wronging black com-
munities, should be abolished. That these distributive injustices are heavily
influenced by implicit racial bias indicates why abolition is likely to be the
only effective and just remedy for those injustices.
Some theoreticians of injustice will worry that our appeal to the un-
just distribution of legal status and protections does not get to the heart
of the racial injustice in question. They may assert that the injustices with
which we are concerned are instantiations of black oppression, oppres-
sion which is not adequately conceptualized by talking of distributive in-70. Lenta and Farland, “Desert, Justice, and Capital Punishment,” 288–89.
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Ajustice. For these theorists, just social relations manifest equality insofar
as they achieve equality of relations and the absence of domination.71
We cannot hope to hash out theoretical disputes such as this here, nor
(in our estimation) need this be done in order to vindicate our conclu-
sions concerning capital punishment. For we simply note that some dis-
tributions of nonmaterial goods (in this case, political goods such as legal
status and the law’s protections) are unjust and that these distributions
can be conceptualized in different terms: as violations of basic natural
rights, as failures to mitigate the effects of luck, as indications of the mar-
ginalization or powerlessness typical of oppressive social relations, and so
on. Thus, we do not share Young’s belief that “serious conceptual confu-
sion” results from any attempt to capture injustices related to nonmaterial
goods in distributive terms.72 On the contrary: in the case of race and cap-
ital punishment, the social or community wrongs associated with Ameri-
can capital punishment cannot be grasped without reference to distribu-
tive facts about nonmaterial goods. But we take no stand on how best to
conceptualize these wrongs and anticipate that egalitarians of various stripes
can endorse our specific conclusions.
The Black Lives Matter movement asserts that American institutions
havewaged a war onblack communities. Even if ‘war’ is hyperbole, it seems
clear that progress toward greater racial comity and justice will require
building greater trust between black communities and institutions, espe-
cially law enforcement and the legal system. The abolition of capital pun-
ishment in the United States would not only be just; it would also be
a powerful step, both symbolically and substantively, toward ending that
“war” and establishing peace across divisions of race.71. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1990), 8; Elizabeth Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?,” Ethics 109
(1999): 287–337; Sally Haslanger, “Oppressions: Racial and Other,” in Racism in Mind,
ed. M. P. Levine and T. Pataki (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 97–123.
72. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 8.
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